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On appeal, TGR argued that Grasmere Brook was a "municipal
separate storm sewer" and a part of a "waste treatment system" and
was, therefore, excluded from the CWA under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)
and 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. In addition, TGR maintained that the brook
was "designed and constructed to carry storm and other waste water
runoff."
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. It
acknowledged the broad meaning of "waters of the United States"
under the CWA and noted that several circuits have held nonnavigable waterways as "waters of the United States." However, the
court largely based its reasoning on the definition of both "waters of
the United States" under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 and "municipal separate
storm sewer" under 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8). Under the latter
category, the sewers must be owned or operated by a public body
(such as a state, city, town, borough, county, parish, district, or
association). Testimony at trial established that no public body owned
or operated the brook. Furthermore, the court noted that the
exclusion for waste treatment systems only applied to manmade bodies
of water. Testimony provided at trial demonstrated the brook was
considered a "natural waterway housing aquatic life and water fowl."
The court held that as a natural tributary of a navigable waterway,
Grasmere Brook was part of the "waters of the United States" under
the CWA; TGR's discharge into the tributary violated the CWA; and
thus confirmed the conviction.
Karina Serkin

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d
107 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that two citizens' environmental groups
did not have standing to bring an action under the Clean Water Act).
Gaston Copper owned and operated a non-ferrous metals
smelting facility on the waters of Lake Watson in South Carolina. The
company received a renewed National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System Permit from the state Department of Health and
Environmental Control in February 1991. In September 1991, two
non-profit environmental organizations ("FOE" and "CLEAN")
brought suit on behalf of their members against Gaston pursuant to
the Clear Water Act ("CWA"). The suit alleged that Gaston exceeded
effluent limitations for various pollutants and failed to comply with
reporting requirements. FOE and CLEAN argued these violations
affected their ability to protect and improve South Carolina's waters
and also "affected the health, economic, recreational, aesthetic and
environmental interests of their members," residing in the vicinity of
waters that receive runoff from Lake Watson. Gaston moved to dismiss
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the case on the ground that FOE and CLEAN lacked standing. FOE
and CLEAN argued that their members had suffered injury in fact and
supported this with testimony of three members who were allegedly
harmed by Gaston's activities.
One witness testified that he believed his lake contained mercury,
based upon a news article, which stated that lakes in his area contained
this element. He also had his lake tested for pollutants prior to 1991,
with the final results of the test indicating that there were effluents in
his lake. Due to this fact, he claimed he did not recreate in the lake
often and that his property value diminished. A second witness
testified to concerns of the Gaston facility polluting a nearby river
thereby affecting his enjoyment of canoeing and swimming in the
river. A third witness also expressed concern that nearby waters
contained contaminants and, therefore, he was less likely to dive in the
waters. FOE and CLEAN also argued that effluents which Gaston
discharged into Lake Watson flowed downstream and adversely
affected members' protected interests in the waters.
The district court determined that FOE and CLEAN failed to
establish standing. It found that the testimony of the three witnesses
did not, standing alone, establish that the interests of the citizens'
groups were adversely affected. FOE and CLEAN appealed to the
Fourth Circuit, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing their
CWA claim.
In order to establish standing, Article III requires a party to show
(1) that he personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the illegal conduct of the defendant; (2) that the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) that the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
The court of appeals held that the evidence failed to show that the
waters which the witnesses used were actually or in imminent threat of
being adversely affected by pollution. It stated that the witness who
tested his lake failed to conduct toxicity tests on the lake during or
after 1991. The interested witness should have performed toxicity tests
for this period because the action arose out of Gaston's conduct since
1991. Additionally, none of the members testified that there was any
observable negative impact on the waters. The court found that their
concerns were "based upon mere speculation as to the presence of
pollution." Furthermore, there was no evidence showing that the
pollutants found in one of the members' lakes was traceable to
Gaston's facility. The court stated that even assuming arguendo that
FOE and CLEAN's members suffered injury in fact, they failed to
establish that the waterways contained effluent directly traceable to
Gaston. The court found it significant that the lake and the river
about which the witnesses testified were many miles away from Lake
Watson and that there were many intervening ponds and tributaries in
between, however, the court mentioned in a footnote that it was not
requiring a plaintiff to establish mileage limits in order to satisfy the
"fairly traceable" prong of standing. Based upon the evidence, the
court concluded the plaintiffs had not demonstrated standing.
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In a vigorous dissent, the chief judge argued the majority had
raised the threshold for establishing standing by "erecting standing
hurdles so high as to effectively excise the citizen suit provision from
the Clean Water Act." He also contended that the holding required
courts to litigate scientific facts as a matter of standing and that the
"fairly traceable" requirement was not equivalent to a requirement of
tort causation. The chiefjudge would have permitted the citizens' suit
upon a finding that the case satisfied the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III.
StephaniePickens

United States v. Smithfield Foods, No. 97-2709, 1999 WL 713847 (4th
Cir. Sept. 14, 1999) (affirming the district court's finding of plaintiff's
liability, but reversing and remanding for recalculation of penalty).
Smithfield Foods ("Smithfield") owned and operated two swine
slaughtering and processing plants that discharged wastewater into the
Pagan River located in Virginia. The discharged wastewater contained
pollutants regulated under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") thus
requiring a permit under a process overseen by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") and locally administered by the Virginia
State Water Control Board ("Board"). In 1986, the Board issued
Smithfield a permit ("1986 Permit") for discharge of a restricted
amount of pollutants into the Pagan River.
At the time of the issuance of the 1986 Permit, Virginia issued new
regulations stating all permits required modification to lower the
monthly average of phosphorus discharged into rivers. In 1990, the
Board modified the 1986 Permit, resulting in a new permit ("1990
Permit") that instructed Smithfield to comply with the more restrictive
state phosphorus limitation within three years.
Smithfield and Virginia began negotiations that resulted in an
agreement involving various accommodations ("1990 Order").
Smithfield agreed to investigate the feasibility of connecting its plants
to the local sanitation system in order to resolve its wastewater
treatment problem, while the Board agreed to postpone
commencement of the compliance schedule for roughly one year.
The Board amended the 1990 Order in May of 1991 ("1991 Order").
The 1991 Order stated that if Smithfield chose to connect its systems
to the local sanitation system, it must do so within three months of the
In
notification that the necessary equipment was operational.
addition, the 1991 Order mandated Smithfield comply with interim
regulations until the connection was complete. The 1991 Order
explicitly stated that it did not modify the 1990 Permit. Smithfield
notified the Board of its decision to connect its facilities to the existing
sanitation system on June 7, 1991.
Contemporaneous to the 1991 Order, the 1990 Permit expired.
The Board composed a new permit. The proposed permit contained

